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Abstract: Population aging is just beginning to hit the industrialized countries in full force, and it
will have a tremendous impact on capital markets. Capital market effects of population aging are
particularly strong in continental European economies such as Germany, with their large pay-as-
you-go public pension systems. The younger generations in these countries are becoming aware of
the need to provide for more retirement income through own private saving, and these effects will
be accentuated by fundamental pension reforms that aim at more pre-funding. Population aging
therefore changes households’ savings behavior and portfolio composition, and much more assets
will be invested in the stock market. Capital markets will grow in size, and active institutional in-
vestors such as pension funds are likely to become more important in continental European coun-
tries.
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Continental European countries such as France, Germany and Italy, have large pay-as-you-go
public pension systems that face severe problems due to population aging (for early accounts of
the aging crisis, see OECD, 1988, and World Bank, 1994). As computed by the International
Monetary Fund (Chand and Jaeger, 1996), the size of the public pension systems relative to GDP
will increase by about 50 percent from 1995 to 2030 in France and in Italy, and almost double in
Germany, if benefits stay as they were in 1992 in real terms (see table 1). If the additional expen-
ditures are financed solely by contributions, these will rise approximately in proportion. Expressed
as a percentage of the wage bill, French workers would then pay 38 percent to their pension sys-
tem in the year 2030 rather than 24 percent in 1995. In Germany, the contribution rate would rise
to 41 percent, and in Italy even to 62 percent of the wage bill. If the additional burden was fi-
nanced solely by debt, it would exceed 100 percent of GDP in France, 115 percent in Germany,
and as much as 180 percent in Italy by the year 2035. Similar numbers have been published by the
OECD (Rosevaere et al., 1996). Fundamental pension reforms that involve a shift towards more
pre-funding of retirement income appear to be the only way out of the pension crisis caused by
demographic change.
In this paper, I discuss how reforms of the pay-as-you-go pension systems in countries such as that
passed in Germany in 2001 affect capital markets. Germany as well as other continental European
countries with large pay-as-you-go pension systems such as France and Italy has thin capital mar-
kets in the sense that only few households own and control productive capital (either directly or
via investment and pension funds). French, German and Italian savers hold a considerable smaller
share of stocks than Anglo-Saxon households. As a result, stock market capitalization is low in
these three countries, and pension funds play only a minor role in household saving (see table 2).
The focus of the paper is Germany and its 2001 pension reform, the so-called “Riester reform”,
although I will stress that population aging itself would have strong effects on capital markets even
in the absence of a reform that introduces a funded component to the pension system.
The line of argument is straightforward. Population aging (or, more generally, demographic
change) is a fact in virtually all countries across the world (with some differences in timing).
Population aging will change households’ saving behavior – even if current pension systems were2
to be maintained – because the internal rate of return of pay-as-you-go pension systems will de-
crease, making own savings as a vehicle for retirement income both more necessary and more at-
tractive. Moreover, in many countries, such as Germany, population aging makes fundamental
reform of public pension systems a top priority, reducing retirement benefits from the public pen-
sion system and strengthening the need for own savings for retirement even more.
A macroeconomic simulation model shows that these mechanisms result in rising aggregate sav-
ings and capital stocks over the first few decades of this century, while thereafter, when the baby-
boom cohorts retire, the higher old-age dependency ratio will lead to lower saving rates. Our
quantitative predictions show that the amount of additional capital generated until about 2035 is
substantial. Finally, increased household saving and changes in households’ portfolio structure will
also change the nature of capital markets, in particular in those countries that implement funda-
mental pension reforms. Even if no additional savings were created, a higher share of savings
would flow into stock and bond markets.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I discuss how population aging
has created the need for fundamental pension reform in Germany. Section 3 delivers a picture of
households’ life-cycle saving decisions and portfolio choice, and links it to the existing pay-as-you-
go pension systems. In section 4, I consider how pension reform affects capital markets from a
macroeconomic perspective, and I present quantitative predictions of the size of the capital stock
generated by households’ optimal response to population aging and pension reform. Section 5
summarizes and concludes.
2. The need for fundamental pension reform
Germany’s public pay-as-you-go pension system faces severe problems which can hardly be solved
without introducing a substantial degree of pre-funding. I first present some demographic projec-
tions that highlight the problems faced by the public pension system. I then outline the main meas-
ures of the 2001 pension reform.3
2.1 Demographic change and the German public pension system
According to OECD projections (Rosevaere et al., 1996), Germany’s old-age dependency ratio
(i.e., the ratio of the number of persons aged 65 and older and of the number of persons between
ages 20 and 64) will about double from 26.0 percent in 2000 to around 50.0 percent in 2030. Fig-
ure 1 shows the old-age dependency ratio for several OECD countries. Note that dependency ra-
tios increase throughout the OECD countries, but Germany has one of the most severe aging
problems.1 There are two main reasons for population aging, the first is decreasing fertility (i.e.,
less children are born per woman), the second is increasing length of life. Both are hard to influ-
ence by economic policy, so policy-makers have to focus on how to deal with the consequences of
population aging.
In the remainder, I focus on demographic change and pension reform in Germany.2 As most conti-
nental European countries, Germany has a contribution-based pay-as-you-go pension system
which covers almost all workers and provides most of their retirement incomes through a single
system. Historically, this system has been very successful in providing a high and reliable level of
retirement income. In recent years, however, the German public pension system has been under
increasing pressure (see Börsch-Supan, 1998b). In the year 1997, to balance current pension
claims of retirees with current revenue from workers, the contribution rate to the public pension
system has increased to 20.3 percent of the payroll.3 Additional increases of the contribution rate
could be avoided only by substantial subsidies from general tax revenue. The recent increase in
federal subsidies, mostly financed through new taxes on the consumption of energy and mineral
oil, was sufficient to cut the contribution rate to its current level of 19.1 percent (but of course,
this cut does not imply that the public pension system has become more stable). In 2000, the total
subsidy to the public pension budget was about EUR 50 bn, the largest expenditure item in the
government budget, about a fifth of total government spending.
                                               
1 It should also be noted that populations are aging not only in industrial countries, but also in developing countries, see Ludwig
(2002).
2 Pension reforms in other European countries are discussed, inter alia, by Boldrin et al. (1999), Disney (2000), and Börsch-
Supan and Miegel (2001).
3 Technically, the contribution to the public pension system is split equally between employees and employers. From an eco-
nomic viewpoint, this distinction is purely rhetoric.4
There are two main reasons for the increasing difficulties of the public pension system. In addition
to population aging, the public pension system provides substantial negative incentive effects on
labor supply. In particular, demographic problems have been exacerbated by a strong decrease in
labor force participation due to early retirement and unemployment, and by a shift to jobs that es-
cape social security taxation. The declining labor force participation in these countries can at least
partially be attributed to the negative incentive effects of their public pension systems (Gruber and
Wise, 1999; Schnabel, 1999).
Figure 2 shows projections of the number of pensioners relative to the number of workers. This is
the key ratio that determines the financial situation of a pay-as-you-go pension system since at
every point in time, payments to current pensioners have to be financed by current workers via
wage taxes (if the public pension system is not allow to run a deficit and ignoring, or holding con-
stant, subsidies financed from federal taxes). Because workers retire, on average, much earlier
than age 65 years in Germany, and since not all persons aged 20 to 64 are working, this ratio is
much higher than the pure old-age dependency ratio depicted in figure 1.
Demographic projections necessarily involve making assumptions about major driving forces of
demographic change. Figure 2 shows how varying these assumptions changes the predictions. Ac-
cording to Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999), the modest aging and constant fertility scenario is the
most likely scenario. Even a very optimistic and also quite unlikely scenario in which the increase
in life expectancy slows down (“weak aging”) and fertility starts to increase again results in a dete-
riorating demographic situation. In a pessimistic scenario, the ratio of pensioners to workers might
approach one by the year 2050. In addition to fertility and life expectancy, there are two other
main factors – immigration and labor market conditions such as female labor market participation
or unemployment – that determine demographic change. In figure 2, medium scenarios are used
for these two factors; Birg and Börsch-Supan (1999) present a sensitivity analysis similar to that
contained in figure 2 that varies these two factors as well.
Given the restriction that the pay-as-you-go pension system cannot run a deficit, and if subsidies
from general tax revenues are held constant, the projections in figure 2 imply directly that the
contribution rate to the public pension system must increase dramatically from its already high
levels in the first half of this century if current replacement rates were to be maintained. Figure 35
shows projections for the direct contribution rate (excluding subsidies financed from other taxes)
for three demographic scenarios.4 It is evident that contribution rates of 28 percent or more are
not acceptable; Börsch-Supan (1998b) provides a more detailed discussion. Population aging is
therefore a serious threat to the stability of the pay-as-you-go public pension systems in Germany
and elsewhere in continental Europe.
2.2 The 2001 pension reform
Germany has experienced a flurry of pension reforms in recent years, but they have not succeeded
in stabilizing contribution rates, public support, and system enrollment. Given the demographic
projections presented in the previous section, the prospects for the future are much worse.
Economists’ suggestions for a fundamental pension reform that would address the crisis caused by
population aging have primarily focused on schemes that hold the contribution rate fixed at its
current level, which automatically implies that replacement rates will have to go down. In effect,
the public pension system will become less generous, creating a gap in retirement income. Ra-
tional-forward looking households will start to save more in order to build up funds that yield ex-
tra income during retirement and help close the gap left by pension reform. Such a reform would
imply a partial transition to a funding system; the role of public pay-as-you-go benefits will still be
substantial under such a reform.
There are several reasons why it is unrealistic to model a full transition to pre-funding. For exam-
ple, public pension systems traditionally also have redistributive character, and redistribution is,
through one mechanism or the other, always pay-as-you-go. Estimates of the share of pensions
that are pure intra-generational transfers are about 20 percent in Germany (mainly topped-up pen-
sions by a minimum retirement income mechanism and pension points earned while in education or
while raising children), see Börsch-Supan and Reil-Held (2001). This would leave about 80 per-
cent of pensions available for potential privatization in a multi-pillar system. There are also other
reasons to be conservative in the degree of pre-funding. For instance, pay-as-you-go systems have
a built-in insurance against inflation and secular capital market failures (see Miles and Timmer-
                                               
4 The optimistic and pessimistic scenarios are, respectively, combinations of optimistic and pessimistic assumptions for the four
driving factors, as discussed above.6
mann, 1999). Finally, introducing a funded component in a pay-as-you-go pension system involves
transition costs since some generations have to pay both into the public pension system and into
private savings accounts. This is a complicated issue, see Börsch-Supan and Winter (2001) for a
discussion.
In practice, until the year 2000 pension reforms in Germany have been of the parametric type,
changing some feature of the pay-as-you-go pension system, but avoiding more radical steps such
as introducing a funded component. Germany’s 2001 pension reform was radical because for the
first time after the pay-as-you-go-system was introduced in 1957, a funded component is added to
the pension system.5 The size of this funded component is by no means radical – it is small com-
pared with other countries, and arguably too small to solve the old-age crisis of the pay-as-you-go
system.
Even though there are substantial differences in detail and degree, Germany’s 2001 reform oper-
ates along the same lines as the stylized reform model outlined above. In particular, it cuts down
pay-as-you-go benefits, it provides incentives for saving, and it creates new products for private
retirement provision, thus strengthening the second and third pillars of old-age provision (namely,
occupational pension schemes and private old-age provision). The declared goal of the reform is
to keep the (direct) contribution rate below 20 percent until 2020 and below 22 percent beyond
2030 while keeping the replacement rate above 64 percent.
Under the 2001 pension reform, workers should save one percent of their gross wage in author-
ized private pension plans during 2002 and 2003 (up to the earnings cap on contributions to the
public pension system, currently about EUR 57,300). This amount will increase every other year,
reaching a level of four percent of the gross wage in 2008. While savings via private pension ac-
counts are voluntary, the government has created a complex system of incentives to encourage
private provision for old-age that combines tax deductions and direct payments.
The introduction of private pension accounts is complemented by a move to the internationally
compatible system of deferred taxation, which means that voluntary savings via private pension
plans are completely exempt from taxation (unlike mandatory contributions to the pay-as-you-go
                                               
5 When the public pension system was enacted by Bismarck in 1889, it was fully funded. A partial pay-as-you-go system was
introduced in 1957, and once the system’s funds were depleted in 1969, the system become purely pay-as-you-go.7
scheme). Accordingly, pension benefits are subject to taxation.6 In short, the main vehicle for cre-
ating saving incentives is tax credits. In addition, to support low income earners who would not
benefit from tax credits, individual savings can be subsidized directly. This allowance starts with an
amount of EUR 38 per person and year in 2002 and will reach EUR 154 when the reform is com-
pleted in 2008. Spouses are also qualified for the standard allowance, provided that the partner
pays into a separate private savings plan for them. Furthermore, an extra allowance is given for
each child.
For the sake of brevity, I do not comment in detail on the new regulations for occupational pen-
sions. I return to the implications of this alternative way to build up retirement savings in the con-
cluding section; for most of the discussion that follows, the difference is not material. Let it suffice
to say that as an alternative to purchasing personal pension products (which constitute “Riester”
products in the narrow sense), employees can participate in an occupational scheme provided by
their employer (Entgeltumwandlung), with similar subsidies or tax reliefs. Two points are impor-
tant, however. First, even if an employer does not offer a (2
nd pillar) retirement saving scheme,
employees are of course still entitled to subsidies for 3
rd pillar private retirement saving. Second,
occupational pensions are much more flexible than before the reform with respect to vesting peri-
ods and portability.
The 2001 reform is definitely a step in the right direction since it introduces a funded component
to complement a pay-as-you-go system that cannot be maintained at its current level of generosity.
However, it is unclear whether this reform will generate sufficient extra saving – households that
save according to the provisions of the 2001 reform (but not more) might not be able to fill the
entire gap in their retirement incomes created by cutting benefits from the pay-as-you-go system.
This could happen if the new “Riester” savings just replace (“crowd out”) other forms of saving
that households have already done in the past. Moreover, based on realistic demographic projec-
tions, it is likely that pay-as-you-go benefits will have to be cut by more than officially projected in
order to keep the contribution rate below 22 percent, in line the primary goal of Germany’s pen-
sion policy for the coming years; see Bonin (2001) and Schnabel (2001) for detailed assessments
of the 2001 reform. If public pension system benefits are indeed cut further, the gap in old-age
                                               
6 See Börsch-Supan and Lührmann (2000) for a discussion of taxation issues in old-age provision.8
income would increase, and extra saving would be called for. In short, it is likely that the funded
component of the German pension systems will continue to grow. I present realistic simulations in
section 4.
3. Retirement saving and portfolio choice in Germany
To understand the capital market effects of population aging and the 2001 pension reform, it is
useful to take a closer look at households’ life-cycle savings and portfolio choice patterns. The
discussion in this section is based on Börsch-Supan and Winter (2001) who show that relative to
other savings motives, saving for retirement plays only a small role in countries with generous pay-
as-you-go pension systems such as France, Germany and Italy. Turning this argument around, they
argue that a distinct change in savings patterns is likely after a fundamental pension reform be-
cause the retirement savings motive is strengthened. In addition, the 2001 reform provides new
private pension products that channel new savings into stock and bond markets.
3.1 The public pension system, retirement income and life-cycle savings patterns
As a point of departure, it is important to realize that the pay-as-you-go public pension system in
Germany has traditionally been characterized by a very generous replacement rate – it has gener-
ated net retirement incomes that are approximately 70 percent of pre-retirement net earnings. In
addition, the public pension system provides generous survivor benefits that constitute a substan-
tial proportion of total pay-as-you-go pension wealth, and disability benefits at similar and often
even higher replacement levels than old-age pensions. As a result, public pensions are by far the
largest pillar of retirement income. They constitute more than 80 percent of the income of house-
holds headed by persons aged 65 and older, while funded retirement income, such as asset income
from private saving or firm pensions in which the employer saves on behalf of the worker, plays a
much smaller role than, e.g., in the Netherlands or the Anglo-Saxon countries. Börsch-Supan,
Reil-Held and Schnabel (2001) provide a more detailed discussion.
The generosity of the public pension system is reflected in the fact that once they are in retirement,
households in Germany reduce their wealth by much less than predicted by the pure life-cycle the-9
ory of savings. Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held, Rodepeter, Schnabel and Winter (2001) use repeated
cross-section data to separate age from cohort effects, and they find that the observed age-
consumption profiles are rather flat and show almost no dissaving in old age. Apparently, saving
for retirement has historically not been the main savings motive in Germany, even though attitudes
are changing (Boeri, Bösch-Supan and Tabellini, 2001; Bösch-Supan and Essig, 2002b). If other
saving motives, such as precaution and intergenerational transfers, are more important than re-
tirement saving, age-saving profiles are likely to be much flatter than under the famous textbook
life-cycle hypothesis (as German data indeed suggest). This explanation is in line with Jappelli and
Modigliani (1998) who argue that the main mechanism for retirement savings in countries such as
Germany is the pay-as-you-go system. If one adds contributions to these pension systems to sav-
ings and subtracts benefits from them, the familiar textbook hump-shaped saving profiles can be
recovered.
Since household saving patterns currently observed in Germany can be explained largely by the
pay-as-you-go pension systems with its generous retirement benefits, we should expect distinct
changes in saving patterns in the future. As described above, a pension reform towards a multi-
pillar system with a substantial portion of funded retirement income will revive the retirement mo-
tive for saving. Hence, it is likely that saving rates among the young will increase (to accumulate
retirement savings), and saving rates among the elderly will decline sharply (because they will dis-
solve their retirement savings once benefits from the public system decline). In section 4 below, I
present qualitative predictions on these effects.
Note that some substitution between these new savings for old age and other savings is likely. This
will decrease the effect of a fundamental pension reform on the overall household saving rate, but
will increase the effect on portfolio composition. We do not know the precise magnitude of such
effects. Precautionary saving may even increase, while saving for intergenerational transfers is
more likely to decrease in response to introducing a higher degree of self-provided retirement in-
come.10
3.2 Portfolio composition
The German pay-as-you-go public pension system appears to have shaped the composition of
household financial wealth. Table 3 displays portfolio choice in Germany. The small role of stocks
and mutual funds in Germany is apparent: In the most recent 1997 data, stocks amount to 8.3 per-
cent, mutual funds to 6.6 percent and fixed-income securities to 17.1 percent of financial portfo-
lios. Börsch-Supan and Essig (2002a) show that stock market participation is extremely low in
Germany – in 1993, only 12 percent of households held stocks directly (total stock ownership,
including indirect holdings, was 19.8 percent). By 1998, direct stock holding has increased to 17.6
percent, but stock market participation is still well below other countries’ levels. The reasons for
German households’ unwillingness to hold risky assets are still not well understood.
In the financial portfolios data presented in table 3, the large share of life insurance wealth is par-
ticularly interesting; the main reason for the important role of whole life insurance in German
households’ life-cycle savings decisions is its favorable tax treatment (see Brunsbach and Lang,
1998, and Walliser and Winter, 1999). At the household level, financial saving in whole life insur-
ance is more important than saving in stocks and bonds (see Eymann and Börsch-Supan, 2002).
The important role of whole life insurance is also significant for financial markets, as life-insurance
companies are not allowed to invest significantly in stocks, which in turn has been one of the main
reasons for thin capital markets in Germany (see Deutsche Bank Research, 1996). These restric-
tions will become less important because of increased availability of alternative products and the
resulting increase in competition for retirement saving.
Portfolio composition in Germany is likely to change under a partial transition to a multi-pillar
system. Börsch-Supan and Winter (2001) predict that – given that there were no substitution be-
tween new retirement saving and current saving – the net household saving rate would increase by
about 4 percentage points. If all of this new saving was channeled into pension funds, pension
funds would amount to between 15 and 18 percent of households’ portfolios, comparable to the
United Kingdom, the U.S., the Netherlands and Switzerland. Substitution between new retirement
saving and current saving would increase this share, although part of new retirement saving may
also be made through whole life insurance given its preferential tax treatment. Moreover, the new
private pension products involve a nominal guarantee – that is, the provider must guarantee the11
nominal value of contributions. This restriction has substantial effects on asset management: pro-
viders won’t be able to invest assets fully in the stock market as in a traditional Anglo-Saxon pen-
sion fund. Households’ direct and indirect exposure to stock markets therefore depends on future
investment decisions made by the providers of private pension products. Additional changes in the
(indirect) asset allocation of households might occur since life insurance companies have recently
begun to increase their portfolio share of stocks, after changes in regulations that govern their
investment policies.
While exact predictions are difficult, a more prominent role of equities on the supply side of the
capital markets seems very likely when the provision of retirement income is shifted from the pay-
as-you-go pension system towards a funded component. This is in line with the international expe-
rience in countries as diverse as the United Kingdom, the U.S., the Netherlands and Switzerland.
4. Pension reform and capital markets
From a macroeconomic point of view, population aging changes the balance between capital and
labor, in particular in industrialized countries. Labor supply is going to be relatively scarce
whereas capital is going to be relatively abundant. This will drive up wages relative to the rate of
return on capital, reducing households’ incentive to save (if the interest elasticity of saving is posi-
tive). In addition, some fraction of the capital stock may become obsolete due to the shrinking
labor force and diminishing returns to scale, making the accumulation of capital even less attrac-
tive. In general, these mechanisms should eventually result in a declining rate of return on capital.
An alternative interpretation is that once the baby-boom generations retire around the year 2030,
they start consuming out of their retirement savings; this will result in capital market outflows, and
via declining prices for financial assets reduce rates of return – the so-called “asset market melt-
down hypothesis”, see Poterba (2001) for a discussion. In this section I discuss these mechanisms
and the meltdown hypothesis. I first present quantitative predictions for capital market inflows and
outflows, then I turn to the effects on the rate of return, and finally, I discuss effects of pension
reform on corporate governance and equity culture.12
4.1 Capital market inflows and outflows
In order to quantify the macroeconomic effects of population aging and pension reform, Börsch-
Supan, Heiss and Winter (2000) have developed a dynamic simulation model. This model is a ver-
sion of the overlapping generations model as introduced by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). Over-
lapping generations models have been used extensively to study the effects of population aging on
social security systems, a purpose for which they are well suited since they are based on house-
holds’ and firms’ optimal reactions to movements in the demographic structure and public policy
measures. The model by Börsch-Supan, Heiss and Winter (2000) is a very stylized representation
of the real world in many respects, but it focuses on the first-order effects of demographic change
on capital markets. In particular, demographic projections used in this 75-generation model are
very detailed (these projections are based on Birg and Börsch-Supan, 1999).
Consider first the effects of a fundamental pension reform that freezes contribution rates to the
public pay-as-you-go pension system at its current level. Per-capita savings would be substantially
higher under such a reform than under the present system. For example, in the year 2035, when
the peak of the aging problem occurs, per-capita savings are projected to be negative under the
current pay-as-you-go system while they would be positive under a fundamental pension reform.
These projections also suggest that optimal life-cycle behavior generates additional saving under a
fundamental pension reform – it is not the case that additional retirement saving crowds out other
saving totally, as often claimed. The projections by Börsch-Supan, Heiss, and Winter indicate a
substitution of about one third, leaving two thirds to new saving. Figure 4 shows their projections
for the aggregate saving rate, assuming a fundamental pension reform had been enacted in 1999.
The reform scenario they use is deeper than the current reform, with 30 percent of retirement in-
come coming from funded components after full implementation. This reform was suggested by
Börsch-Supan (2002) as a feasible way to address the problems created by population aging.
While the 2001 reform does not go that far, the future might well bring additional reforms that
eventually amount to such a stylized reform.
Based on projections of individual savings decisions, one can compute the aggregate savings gen-
erated by pension reform. Figure 5 shows the accumulated contributions to private pension ac-
counts in Germany. Here, the peak would be reached around the year 2030, with a balance of13
roughly EUR 1,000 bn. held in private savings accounts. This would amount to a substantial frac-
tion of the German economy’s total capital stock. Projections of capital market inflows originating
from the 2001 pension reform, as presented by Morgan Stanley (see Koenig and Mahnert, 2001),
are shown in figure 6. Morgan Stanley predicts that inflows will be close to EUR 100 bn per year
once the reform is fully phased in. The magnitudes of the projections by Börsch-Supan, Heiss, and
Winter and Morgan Stanley are roughly comparable.
It has been argued – the so-called “asset market meltdown hypothesis” – that rates of return on
capital will decrease substantially once the baby-boom cohorts retire; see Poterba (2001) for a
summary of the discussion in the United States. The simulations by Börsch-Supan, Heiss and
Winter (2000) suggest that the decrease in the rate of return on capital – the economic quantity
that drives long-run returns on financial markets – is relatively small, probably less than one per-
centage point around the year 2050 when dissaving effects are be strongest. Poterba comes to a
similar conclusion using historical data for the United States; he could not find large effects of
demographic structure on asset returns. Börsch-Supan, Heiss, and Winter also point out that the
negative rate-of-return effect is primarily due to population aging and its effects on the capital-
labor ratio, not so much due to pension reform. In other words, rates of return would fall even if
the current pay-as-you-go pension system were maintained. Introducing a funded component ex-
acerbates these effects, but the additional decrease cause by pension reform is of second order
relative to the first-order effect from population aging.
Finally, traditional macroeconomic models of pension reform operate using the closed economy
assumption. As Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2002) argue, in a more realistic open-
economy scenario, population aging generates international capital flows that will change rate-of-
return prediction relative to a closed-economy model. While the patterns of population aging are
similar in most countries, the timing differs substantially, in particular between industrialized and
less developed countries. To the extent that capital is internationally mobile, population aging will
therefore induce capital flows between countries. In order to quantify these effects, they develop a
stylized multi-country overlapping generations model, and they use long-term demographic pro-
jections for several world regions to simulate international capital flows over a 50 year horizon.
Their simulations suggest that capital flows from fast-aging industrial countries such as Germany
to the rest of the world will be substantial. Since capital can flow to regions where rates of return14
are relatively higher (because those regions still have more labor relative to capital than Germany),
the decline in the rate of return will be smaller. Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2002) con-
clude that closed-economy models of pension reform miss the effects of international capital mo-
bility which are likely to be quantitatively important.
4.2 Corporate governance and equity culture
Population aging affects the rate of return on capital through its influence on the capital-labor ra-
tio. A pension reform that involves more pre-funding also affects the rate of return primarily
through its (additional) influence on the capital stock and the capital-labor ratio. Moreover, the
additional savings induced by a fundamental pension reform influence the rate of return on capital
via feedback effects from strengthened capital markets. It has been argued that as pension funds
become more important in households’ portfolios, the equity culture in Germany will improve, and
more generally, that capital markets will be strengthened (see Deutsche Bank Research, 1996). In
this section, I sketch the underlying mechanisms only briefly, for details see Börsch-Supan and
Winter (2001).
As pointed out above, few households in Germany hold financial assets with at least some minimal
ownership rights. These assets are highly concentrated among few households, in stark contrast to
countries in which a substantial share of retirement income is financed through pension funds. A
lack of relatively actively managed pension funds contributes to a financial system with diffuse
control structures and weak corporate governance, which in turn results in low capital productiv-
ity relative to other countries (Börsch-Supan and Winter, 2001). Pension reform towards a higher
degree of pre-funding can therefore strengthen corporate governance, increase capital productivity
at constant or even increasing levels of labor productivity, and increase total factor productivity.
Even if such productivity effects of a fundamental pension reform are small, they change the
growth path of an economy and therefore have large effects in the long run.
Pension funds play only a minor role in the capital markets of continental European countries. As
reported by the Bank for International Settlements (1998), in 1996 pension fund assets repre-
sented only 3 percent of total GDP in Germany and 4 percent in Italy, while in the U.S. and the
U.K., the shares were 57 percent and 77 percent, respectively. A fundamental pension reform15
would lead to a significant increase in the funds controlled by investment funds in Germany. Based
on the theoretical and empirical findings about the link between active pension funds and firm
performance (see Börsch-Supan and Winter, 2001), it is likely that an increase in the volume of
equity controlled by pension funds has substantial effects on corporate governance in continental
European countries. The basic theoretical argument has been made, for example, by Pound
(1988): Institutional investors such as pension funds that have no business relations with a firm can
do a better job in disciplining management.
Evaluating the effects of improved corporate governance on capital productivity is a difficult task
given the absence of sufficient variation of institutional arrangements within a single country. In-
ternational comparisons are one way to exploit variation in governance structures. Börsch-Supan
(1998a) combines variation across countries and across companies, using data from company
benchmarking studies by McKinsey Global Institute (1996) for West Germany, Japan and the
United States. He estimates rates of return on investment and investigates the contribution of
capital – more precisely, capital management and capital utilization – to total factor productivity.
Notwithstanding substantial variation across companies and industries, the market sectors of West
Germany and Japan had significantly lower rates of capital utilization in the early 1990s and cre-
ated less productive capacity per unit of physical assets than the United States did. Börsch-Supan
(1998a) shows that these low rates of capital utilization were only partially due to high labor costs
relative to capital, leading to high capital intensity at short work hours. More important for the
aggregate result of poor capital productivity were the many cases in which management did not
focus on how productively they were using their assets. Conversely, a focus on financial perform-
ance, especially prevalent among U.S. firms, did create a clear performance objective that gener-
ally resulted in productivity improvements. Additional empirical results can be found in Hall and
Jones (1999) and Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000).
Quantitative predictions using the macroeconomic model by Börsch-Supan, Heiss and Winter
(2000) illustrate possible feedback effects of improvements in corporate governance and capital
productivity on the rate of return on capital, and on pension reform in general. Suppose that after
the implementation of a fundamental pension reform, the growth rate of total factor productivity
increases by 0.2 percentage points for 15 years (i.e., the productivity effects induced by the reform
are rather modest and only transient). Such an increase in the growth rate of total factor produc-16
tivity raises the rate of return on capital temporarily, by about 0.2 percentage points around the
year 2010. This result shows that feedback effects from capital markets are very powerful: By
making everybody better off, they might address the problem of transitional burdens that arise
during the introduction of a funded component. These benefits can change the welfare effects of a
fundamental pension reform substantially. It is of course hard to predict the exact magnitude of
productivity gains arising from improved corporate governance in Germany; see Börsch-Supan
and Winter (2001) for a detailed discussion.
5. Conclusions
Population aging will change saving behavior, and pension reform – an ongoing process in the
core European countries – will amplify these changes. Population aging will induce an increase in
savings between 2015 and 2025. Saving rates will decline thereafter. Pension reform adds to the
increase and dampens the decrease even though about one third of saving for retirement will dis-
place other saving. A higher share of saving will flow through stock and bond markets, thereby
changing the nature of the capital markets in countries where stock market capitalization is low
and markets for non-government bonds are underdeveloped – notably in France, Germany and
Italy. Finally, there is ample evidence that the size of capital markets and productivity growth are
related. There is also reason to believe that larger capital markets and actively managed investment
and pension funds enhance corporate governance.
There are many open questions. First of all, it is very difficult to predict the exact amount of net
saving generated by the 2001 pension reform. While it is very likely that there will be high demand
for the new products, these savings might just crowd out existing saving such as life insurance
contracts or pre-Riester occupational pensions. It is hard to assess how large this crowing-out
effect will be, but as Börsch-Supan (2002) argues, it might be substantial since the government
still publishes overly optimistic projections of contribution rates to, and replacement rates of, the
pay-as-you-go pension system (see also Schnabel, 2001). Thus, households’ total saving (existing
saving that is kept up, plus new saving in Rieser products) might be less than actually required to
close the old-age income gap. For the same reason, total saving might also be less than predicted
by long-term forecasting models such as those reported in this paper, since these models assume17
perfect information about future conditions, including retirement income obtained from the pay-as-
you-go system.
For financial markets, one of the most important questions is: How will the new funds generated
by the German pension reform be divided between stock and bond markets? Much of the discus-
sion in this paper focused on simulations with very stylized models of pension reform. The 2001
pension reform in Germany is complicated by the fact that private pension products that qualify for
government incentives (subsidies or tax credits) need to provide a nominal guarantee – that is, the
provider must guarantee the nominal value of contributions. This restriction has substantial effects
on asset management: providers won’t be able to invest assets fully in the stock market as in a
traditional Anglo-Saxon defined-contribution pension schemes. Rather, a substantial fraction of
assets will have to be invested in bonds.
Also, it is as yet unclear how the market for private pension products will be divided among insur-
ance firms, banks and pension funds. Currently, the key players in these markets enter into fierce
competition for private pension savings, and the outcome of such a competitive process is hard to
predict. Moreover, occupational pension plans are a potential substitute for private pension prod-
ucts (i.e., “Riester” products in the narrow sense) since they are eligible for similar subsidies or tax
reliefs. Interestingly, these products are less tightly regulated, and assets can be more freely in-
vested. It is unclear how the market for occupational pension schemes will be divided. Pensions
funds that try to enter the German market might find it easier to focus on this segment rather than
facing the high distribution costs associated with Riester products.
Finally, many German firms have offered their employees occupational pension schemes in the
past. Even though their role in the provision of retirement income has been small in Germany (less
than 5 percent, compared with 25 percent in the United Kingdom and as much as 40 percent in the
Netherlands), substantial funds have been accumulated. Most of these pre-Riester occupational
pension assets are in the form of direct commitments – that is, they appear as book reserves in
firms’ balance sheets and are not invested in the stock market.7 In the past, these book reserves
have been useful as sources for internal financing of investments, but many firms are now eager to18
move these funds out of their books and invest them in the stock market (in order to improve risk
diversification, for instance). While progress is slow due to complicated tax issues related to the
valuation of book reserves, active management of these funds might open up another interesting
market for pension funds in Germany.
In any case, a fundamental pension reform that involves a shift towards more pre-funding of re-
tirement income such as the 2001 reform in Germany will strengthen capital markets. Since the
2001 reform will most likely be followed by similar reforms in the future, stock and bond markets
will continue to benefit from sizeable inflows of new capital from private and occupational pension
provision for the next two or three decades.
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Table 1: The future of pay-as-you-go pension systems
1995 2010 2030
France
   Pension expenditures  (percent of GDP) 12.5 12.6 19.4
   Equilibrium contribution rate
   (percent of wage bill) 24.3 24.4 37.7
   Fiscal deficit
   (percent of wage bill) 0.5 0.6 100.5
Germany
   Pension expenditures  (percent of GDP) 10.0 11.0 18.4
   Equilibrium contribution rate
   (percent of wage bill) 22.6 24.7 41.1
   Fiscal deficit
   (percent of wage bill) (1.1)
a 8.8 115.6
Italy
   Pension expenditures  (percent of GDP) 16.0 15.2 23.3
   Equilibrium contribution rate
   (percent of wage bill) 42.6 40.4 61.9
   Fiscal deficit
   (percent of wage bill) 0 29.9 186.8
Notes: The equilibrium contribution rate is the percent of the wage bill required if the increase in pension expen-
ditures is financed by contributions only. The fiscal deficit is the percent of the wage bill arising if the increase in
pension expenditures is financed by debt only. a) Surplus.
Source: Chand and Jaeger (1996).22
Table 2: Capital market features, 1996
Pay-as-you-go systems Partially funded systems
France Germany Italy Netherlands UK US
Share of stocks held by households
and institutional investors  ( percent) 
a
6.5 11.4 8.3 . 59.8 43.4
Share of pension funds
( percent of household assets) 
b
3 2 2 . 25 20
Stock market capitalization
( percent of GDP) 
c
26.3 22.9 21.4 96.5 87.0 55.1
Size of pension funds
( percent of GDP) 
b
5.6 3 4 92 77 62
Size of pension funds
(billion USD) 
b
. 65 43 363 897 4,752
Sources: a) OECD Financial Accounts; b) Bank for International Settlements (1998), Table V.5. c) World Bank,
1998, Table 5.2;23
Table 3: Financial asset shares based on national account data
1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 1997
Checking, deposit, and savings ac-
counts
51.6 46.7 39.6 37.1 35.4 33.6
Building society savings contracts 7.8 7.3 5.5 4.1 3.7 3.4
Stocks, bonds, mutual funds on stocks
and bonds and other financial assets
27.4 31.7 38.5 40.4 42.5 40.5
Insurance and pension wealth 13.2 14.5 16.3 18.6 18.6 22.5
Note: Figures are based on national account data. 1975-1992: West Germany, 1997: Germany.
Sources: Deutsche Bundesbank, Börsch-Supan and Essig (2002a).24













Note: The old-age dependency ratio is defined as the number of persons aged 65 and older and of the number of
persons between ages 20 and 64.
Source: OECD (1996).25














Source: Börsch-Supan and Birg (1999).26












Note: The three lines represent alternative demographic scenarios.
Source: Börsch-Supan and Birg (1999).27
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Note: This figure shows projections of the aggregate saving rate derived from an overlapping generations model
under benchmark assumptions for demographic change, and for alternative pension systems. The top line is ob-
tained assuming pension reform following the scheme suggested by Börsch-Supan (2002), with hypothetical reform
measures beginning in 1999; the bottom line assumes that a pure pay-as-you-go system is maintained.
Source: Börsch-Supan, Heiss and Winter (2000).28




































Note: This figure shows projections of assets held in private pension accounts after a fundamental pension reform
following the scheme suggested by Börsch-Supan (2002), with hypothetical reform measures beginning in 1999.
Source: Börsch-Supan, Heiss and Winter (2000).29
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Source: Koenig and Mahnert (2001).